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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-2258 
___________ 
 
CHANDER KANT, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY;  
KOUSOULAS & ASSOCIATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-00-cv-05204) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 8, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 8, 2011) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Chander Kant appeals pro se from several orders entered by the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm 
the district court’s orders.  
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I. 
 In October 23, 2000, this litigation commenced in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey when Kant filed a pro se complaint, alleging that his 
employer, Seton Hall University, discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Thereafter, on February 23, 2001, Kousoulas 
and Associates, P.C., entered into a retainer agreement with Kant whereby it agreed to 
represent him and Kant agreed to pay a fee of $15,000 plus either 20 percent of any 
recovery, or attorneys’ fees as awarded by the court.  
 Although many of Kant’s claims against Seton Hall were dismissed, his retaliation 
claim proceeded to trial.  He obtained an $80,000 judgment, which was entered on April 
11, 2006.  Kousoulas, with Kant’s assent, filed an application for costs and attorneys’ 
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).  However, Kant discharged Kousoulas prior to 
the fee petition hearing.  Kousoulas thereafter filed a motion to intervene to protect its 
interest in the attorneys’ fees.  At the July 2006 fee petition hearing, Kant’s new counsel 
argued for a reduction in the amount to be awarded, but stated that Kant did not otherwise 
object to the fee application.1
                                              
1 Kant discharged his second attorney in October 2006.  
  On July 18, 2006, the district court awarded counsel fees 
of $124,834.95 and costs of $2,595.41.  The July 18th order also denied Kousoulas’s 
motion to intervene, stating that “an attorney, independent of his or her client, has no 
personal right to an award of statutory attorneys’ fees.”  The district court did note, 
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however, that “plaintiff’s former attorneys may have a separate claim pursuant to the 
retainer agreement entered into with plaintiff for their fees.” 
 Seton Hall and Kant appealed from the April 11, 2006 judgment, which this Court 
affirmed on May 29, 2008.  (C.A. Nos. 06-4448 & 06-4464.)  Seton Hall then paid to 
Kant the $80,000 judgment and deposited the fee award with the district court.  Seton 
Hall is no longer part of the litigation.  
 Soon thereafter, because Kant refused to authorize payment of the fee award to 
Kousoulas, Kousoulas sent to Kant a fee arbitration notice pursuant to New Jersey Court 
Rule 1:20A-6.  When Kant did not commence fee arbitration proceedings, Kousoulas 
filed a petition in the district court for determination and enforcement of an attorney fee 
lien pursuant to New Jersey law.  On January 27, 2009,  Kant filed an answer to the fee 
lien petition as well as a counterclaim against Kousoulas, asserting claims of legal 
malpractice and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.   
 On March 30, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s tortious interference claim 
as time-barred.  And on September 9, 2009, the district court granted Kousoulas’s motion 
for summary judgment as to its attorney fee lien and its motion to dismiss Kant’s legal 
malpractice claim.  The September 9th order also denied as moot Kant’s motion for 
default judgment.  Kousoulas then filed a motion for release of the funds, and Kant 
moved for reconsideration of the September 2009 order.  On March 30, 2010, the district 
court granted Kousoulas’s motion and denied Kant’s motion for reconsideration.     
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 Kant now appeals from the district court’s March 30, 2009, September 9, 2009, 
and March 30, 2010 orders.2
II.  
  
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE FEE LIEN PETITION 
 On September 9, 2009, the district court granted Kousoulas’s motion for summary 
judgment as to its fee lien petition after determining that the retainer agreement, which 
stated that fees awarded are to be paid to Kousoulas, was an enforceable contract.3
 As the district court recognized, in New Jersey the relationship between an 
attorney and client is contractual.  See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 679 
  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s conclusions of law and review its findings 
of fact for clear error.  See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 
F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003).  In doing so, we employ the same standard used by the 
district court in deciding a motion for summary judgment.  Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers 
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary judgment is proper where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  
                                              
2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
3 We note that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
the fee dispute.  See Kalyawongsa v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283, 287-88 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “although attorneys’ fee arrangements are contracts under state law, the 
federal court’s interest in fully and fairly resolving the controversies before it requires 
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over fee disputes that are related to the main 
action”); Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212, 217-18 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
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A.2d 1188, 1196 (N.J. 1996) (“Agreements between attorneys and clients concerning the 
client-lawyer relationship generally are enforceable, provided the agreements satisfy both 
the general requirements for contracts and the special requirements of professional 
ethics.”).  And in determining that Kousoulas’s fee lien petition should be enforced, the 
district court explained that:  
The facts of record establish that Petitioner has rendered legal services to 
Kant pursuant to the Retainer Agreement.  As a result of these services, 
Kant obtained a damages award of $80,000.00.  Additionally, Kant and 
Petitioner filed a fee application and the Court granted said application.  
The facts presented establish that Kant agreed to turn over any fees 
awarded by the Court to Petitioner.  The fees are to be paid by Seton Hall 
University, and, therefore, there is no loss incurred by Kant.  Kant has 
provided neither legal authority nor facts to support his position that he 
does not have to turn over the fees awarded to Petitioner. 
  
 Kant asserts that the district court made several erroneous findings of fact in 
making its decision, including that he “agreed to turn over any fees awarded by the Court 
to [Kousoulas].”  In support, he references several statements that he made regarding his 
continuing assertion that he, not Kousoulas, should be awarded attorney’s fees.  
However, the district court’s finding is correct, as Kant agreed “to pay [Kousoulas] 
twenty percent (20%) of the sum recovered, . . . or any legal fees awarded to [Kousoulas] 
by the Court, whichever is greater,”  when he signed the retainer agreement.   
 Further, although Kant correctly asserts that “courts scrutinize contracts between 
attorneys and clients to ensure that they are fair,” Cohen, 679 A.2d at 1196, he does not 
argue that the retainer agreement itself is unfair or unethical.  Rather, Kant’s primary 
argument appears to be that Kousoulas should not be awarded fees because Kant is likely 
to succeed on his counterclaims.  However, Kant’s success or failure on his 
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counterclaims has no bearing on the fee award paid by Seton Hall to Kousoulas pursuant 
to the retainer agreement. 
 Moreover, despite Kant’s argument to the contrary, he is not eligible for the 
attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as it is well-established that, “[s]ince 
the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards 
must accrue to counsel.”  Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(receded from on other grounds in Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 
1980)).   
 Kant’s remaining arguments are meritless.  Therefore, we will affirm the district 
court’s orders granting Kousoulas’s motion for summary judgment as to its fee lien 
petition and denying Kant’s motion for reconsideration of that decision. 
B. DISMISSAL OF KANT’S COUNTERCLAIMS  
 In its March 30, 2009 and September 9, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s 
counterclaims to Kousoulas’s fee lien petition. We review de novo the dismissal of a 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 
188 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 (1) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 
 In January 2009, Kant asserted a claim against Kousoulas for tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage.  He asserted that in January 2001, he received a 
one-year appointment as a visiting scholar at Columbia University, and that in the spring 
of 2002, the senior faculty in the Economics Department voted to hire him.  In May 2002, 
Kant told Kousoulas that he was likely to receive a full-time faculty appointment.  
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However, within a week after Kant’s conversation with Kousoulas, Columbia University 
advised him that he had not been selected for the position.  Due to the timing of these two 
events, Kant believes that Kousoulas prevented him from obtaining the job at Columbia 
University.  On March 30, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s counterclaim as time-
barred because it was filed beyond either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of 
limitations for such claims. 
 The district court’s decision is correct.  Because the district court determined that 
Kant’s claim was time-barred under either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of 
limitations, it did not engage in a choice-of-law analysis. The New Jersey statute of 
limitations for a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is 
six years.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.  New York has a three-year statute of limitations 
for such claims.  Besicorp Ltd. v. Kahn, 736 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).  
Under New Jersey law, “a statute of limitations begins to run when all elements of a 
cause of action are present, or, more plainly, from the moment of the wrong.”  Michaels 
v. State of N.J., 955 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D.N.J. 1996) (internal citation and quotation 
omitted).  Similarly, in New York, “a tort claim accrues as soon as the claim becomes 
enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.”  
IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 140 (N.Y. 2009).  
Here, Kant’s claim accrued in May 2002, when he was told that he did not receive the 
position at Columbia University.  Kant, did not, however, bring his tortious interference 
claim until January 27, 2009.  The claim was therefore untimely under either New York 
or New Jersey law.  Further, the district court properly determined that Kant did not 
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provide grounds to toll the statute of limitations on equitable grounds or delay it under 
the discovery rule.   
 (2) Legal Malpractice 
 Kant also claimed that Kousoulas had committed legal malpractice by, among 
other things, creating an expectation that he would recover $300,000 in damages from 
Seton Hall and failing to amend the original complaint to include a request for punitive 
damages.  The district court dismissed the claim because Kant failed to produce an 
Affidavit of Merit, as is required by New Jersey law.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27.   
 Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff alleging malpractice by a licensed professional 
must, “provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that 
there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or 
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell 
outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.”  Id.  
New Jersey does, however, provide that “[i]n lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff may 
provide a sworn statement that, after written request, the defendant failed to provide the 
plaintiff with records that have a substantial bearing on the preparation of the affidavit.”  
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing to N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:53A-28).  Further, an affidavit is not required when the case turns on common 
knowledge.  “The factual predicate for a common knowledge case is one where the 
carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and 
ordinary experience.”  Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  If, however, “the claim’s 
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underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard 
of care applicable to that specific profession,” an affidavit of merit is required.  Couri v. 
Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (N.J. 2002).  Kant unsuccessfully argues both that he 
substantially complied with the affidavit of merit requirement and that an affidavit is not 
required because his claim turns on common knowledge.4
 First, to be relieved of the obligation to file an affidavit of merit, Kant was 
required to file a sworn statement that Kousoulas had failed to provide the documents that 
could form the basis of an affidavit of merit.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53-28.  He claims 
that he provided such a statement.  However, the document that he relies upon is an 
unsworn statement that he attached to a motion for default judgment, in which he asserted 
that Kousoulas had not complied with the district court’s scheduling order regarding 
discovery and other pretrial matters.  Apart from being unsworn, the statement does not 
assert that Kousoulas’s alleged noncompliance with the scheduling order had any effect 
on Kant’s ability to obtain an affidavit of merit, much less reference the affidavit of merit 
statute.  Therefore, this document does not constitute a sworn statement under New 
Jersey law.  
   
    Kant also argues that because his claim sounded in contract and because its merit 
was “apparent from  a reading of [his] complaint,” no affidavit of merit was required.  
This argument lacks merit.  His claim, which alleged that Kousoulas failed to adequately 
represent his interests in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, required proof of a deviation from the 
                                              
4 We have determined that Kousoulas’s remaining arguments regarding the 
affidavit of merit statute, which include an assertion that the statute is unconstitutional, 
are meritless. 
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professional standard of care and thus required an affidavit of merit.  See Couri, 801 A.2d 
at 1151.  The case did not fall within the “common knowledge” doctrine because the 
alleged professional failings of Kousoulas (including her legal judgment) were not so 
apparent that no expert was required to demonstrate a deviation from the accepted 
standard of care.  See Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 500-01 (N.J. 2001).  
C. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
 Finally, Kant’s assertion that this Court should vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of his motion for default judgment as moot is meritless.   Because the district 
court entered judgment in favor of Kousoulas, it properly denied as moot Kant’s motion 
for default judgment.  See Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, 
Forgers & Helpers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that “questions of 
mootness are considered under a plenary standard of review”).   
III. 
 In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s orders.  Kant 
has also filed several motions before this Court, including a motion to reconsider our 
decision to dismiss his motion for a stay of execution of the district court’s judgment.  
We now deny all of Kant’s pending motions as moot.  We grant Kousoulas’s motion to 
file a supplemental brief.  
 
